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Political Exiles Reckon with a Rising China and a Lost Cause 
——— 
By HAN CHEN 
 
The last days of the most prominent Chinese dissident were brief. 
 
In late June, prison authorities in China announced that Liu Xiaobo was being given medical 
parole to be treated for late-stage liver cancer. Two weeks later, he was dead at 61.  
 
For dissidents abroad, like Hu Ping, the loss was as devastating as if a lodestar had fallen. Hu, a 
democracy activist who left China for Harvard University in 1987, saw Liu as the leading human 
rights champion among them.  Hu twice hosted the future Nobel Peace Prize laureate at his home 
in the United States before Liu returned to Beijing to lead the mass movement against the 
government that began at Tiananmen Square in 1989. 
 
“China desperately needs a symbol like Liu Xiaobo, and it will be quite hard to replace him 
now,” Hu said. “That’s why so many of us were deeply saddened by his passing.” 
Barely hours after Chinese prison authorities announced Liu’s death, U.S. President Donald 
Trump reacted in a way that only multiplied their anguish. 
 
At a G-20 press conference in Paris, Trump called President Xi Jinping of China “a terrific guy.” 
On the same day, he issued a tepid 45-word condolence, bypassing any mention of Liu’s 
incarceration under the authoritarian regime.  
 
Human rights activists were dispirited. 
 
They had lost another pivotal battle against what they perceive as the repressive Chinese 
Communist Party, which swept to power in 1949 after a bloody civil war and has ruled the 
country under socialist ideologies since then. Beyond their sorrow and indignation, the dissidents 
confronted an uncomfortable question: What use were they if their voices no longer really 
mattered to Chinese and foreign leaders?  
 
The answer, Hu said, was sobering. 
 
“The exiles were very optimistic that the Communist Party would collapse soon after Tiananmen 
because there was huge momentum for a more democratic China in the early ’90s with the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union,” said Hu, the honorary editor-in-chief of the online 
dissident magazine Beijing Spring. “No one could have foreseen that the Party not only would 
survive the turmoil but is growing apace globally.” 
 
The Party’s absolute power was on full display in October. For a week, President Xi held court 
with more than 2,300 delegates of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. 
In his work report, Xi promised to reclaim China’s rightful position in the world in the spirit of 
party elders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Rising above the ashes of colonial vestiges 
and the birth pangs of economic reforms, he has planted himself firmly on the path of what he 
called “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” On his relentless quest, human rights and 
democracy-building are again in the cross hairs.  
 
With the meteoric rise of the Chinese economy in the last two decades and the Party’s 
entrenched political monopoly, political exiles in the United States are watching their cause 
slipping away. Successive U.S. administrations have relinquished their leverage in exchange for 
the multibillion-dollar Chinese market, unwilling to take its leaders to task for human rights 
abuses as they used to. 
 
To complicate the matter, the dissident community has been riven by infighting, which dealt a 
blow to its stature in the eyes of former patrons. Once young and determined, these activists are 
now reckoning with setbacks that are overpowering their democratic ideals. 
 
An Economic Order Transformed  
 
There’s little doubt that China and the United States share a future more than ever before as their 
trade, economic and cultural ties continue to expand. 
 
Their bilateral trade has shot up almost thirtyfold to $578.2 billion in 2016 compared to just $20 
billion in 1990, eclipsing U.S. trade with its neighbors, Mexico and Canada.  
 
At the same time, bilateral direct investments skyrocketed from $546 million in 1990 to $60 
billion in 2016, an increase of over a hundredfold. Many shareholders now depend on the 
economic well-being of both countries, a change that could create large ripple effects in times of 
political uncertainties.  
 
Moreover, the annual number of Chinese tourists to the United States approached 3 million in 
2016 compared with fewer than 250,000 in 2000. These visitors spent $33 billion in 2016, more 
than tourists from any other country. 
 
Domestically, China’s economic heft has also grown steadily in recent decades. According to a 
projection last year by The Conference Board, a U.S.-based business research group, China’s 
contribution to the global GDP by percentage of global economic output will surpass that of the 
United States in 2018.  
 
And as China solidifies its position as the world’s largest exporter, corporate America is coveting 
a bigger slice of the China market. 
 
China now constitutes Apple’s second-largest smartphone market after the United States. 
According to online sales records, the Chinese bought 58.3 million iPhones in 2016, more than 
the number of the devices sold to Europeans and Japanese combined. 
 
Google and Facebook have also tried to woo Beijing lately. Now blocked on the mainland for 
violating China’s tough censorship laws, the two companies crave restoration of their services to 
unlock the purchasing power of China’s 731 million internet users. They have made few inroads 
with Chinese internet regulators in the last few years, but they are still putting out more feelers.  
 
In one instance, Facebook set up a demo page to show CCTV, China’s state-owned broadcast 
network, how to use the platform during President Xi’s 2015 trip to the United States. The page 
was used again this November to post pictures and videos when President Trump visited China 
for the first time.  
 
As China’s foreign trade has ballooned, leading capitalist democracies have become unwilling or 
unable to confront Beijing on its human rights records, fearing that it would imperil 
multinational corporations and investors who bet on further market growth there.   
 
In view of the circumstances, it’s certainly not lost on the political exiles that the interwoven 
destiny of the two economies could banish them to oblivion.  
 
“The democracy movement in exile is going downhill because much of what the United States 
can do today is just posturing, since much of its political leverage has been squandered by 
indulging China on trade,” said Hu, a leading critic of the Chinese government since the 1970s. 
His 50,000-word treatise “On Freedom of Speech,” first published in 1979 in an underground 
magazine, is seen as a seminal polemic on democracy in modern China. 
 
Hu also said the exile movement and dissident community in the mainland are usually in sync. 
As Chinese leaders’ strong-arm tactics have met little opposition internationally, the power of the 
political exiles is also circumscribed by the abject human rights conditions at home. 
A Long Line of Modern Democracy Movements 
 
Despite recent setbacks, the overseas activists have long celebrated their diverse backgrounds, 
according to Chen Jie, associate professor of political science and international relations at the 
University of Western Australia who writes about Chinese political opposition overseas. 
 
While it is the memory of the Tiananmen crackdown—when the military forcibly cleared the 
square and killed hundreds if not thousands of civilians—that registers most keenly with 
Americans, Chinese democracy movements went far beyond Tiananmen Square.  
 
After the scourges of the Cultural Revolution and the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, 
his successor Deng Xiaoping emerged as a reformer who was eager to open up the country 
economically and politically. 
 
During this thawing period in the late 1970s, people started posting commentaries, literatures and 
petitions publicly on a brick wall in Beijing. The authorities initially acquiesced but turned 
against the project a few months later, when it appeared to be getting out of hand and posing a 
threat to the party. Hu Ping, editor of Beijing Spring, was one of the most recognized 
intellectuals from that era. 
 
The 1989 Tiananmen protests and the bloody aftermath were better known because of extensive 
media coverage and international reactions, but it was not the first, Chen stressed. 
 
The last major wave of political exiles followed the founding of the Chinese Democracy Party in 
southeastern China. It was among the country’s first opposition parties, with a platform to end 
the one-party rule. Before the new party could open more branches, the Communist leadership 
swooped in and made dozens of arrests in 1998, handing out lengthy sentences to its organizers.  
 
Since 2000, few democracy movements have broken in China as the ruling party became more 
experienced in preempting public disturbances. The Party was also determined to keep matters 
under control before its all-out bid for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics. 
 
Respect for human rights in China remains miniscule today. Since July 9, 2015, nearly 250 rights 
lawyers and activists have been arrested in a coordinated government operation known as “the 
709 Crackdown,” according to Amnesty International. In a 2017 Freedom House report, China 
scored 15 out of a possible 100 points based on political rights and civil liberties, ranking below 
Iran and Afghanistan. 
 
A Climax, and It All Went Down from There 
 
The United States, especially New York City, has been the hub for Chinese political exiles 
because it is seen as a beacon of the free world, according to dissidents based here. Those 
looking to settle down usually joined others who preceded them, Hu said at his Queens 
apartment. 
 
At its peak in the early 1990s, the Chinese democracy movement in the United States comprised 
800 support groups, he estimated, ranging from fundraisers for Tiananmen victims to refugee 
resettlement organizations. 
 
“At the time, just about any Chinese immigrant on the street was cheering for the movement 
because so much momentum had built up after the crackdown,” said Hu, beaming as he recalled 
the golden years. “You couldn’t be a patriotic Chinese back then without declaring support.” 
 
From 1988 to 1991, Hu was the second chairman of the Chinese Democracy Alliance, the first 
Chinese overseas opposition organization since 1949. The group was founded in New York by 
Wang Bingzhang, a U.S. permanent resident who was kidnapped at the Vietnamese border in 
2002 and has remained in Chinese state custody ever since. During its heyday, the alliance 
counted thousands of members and branches in dozens of countries. 
 
In September 1989, Tiananmen exiles helped found the Federation for a Democratic China and 
soon established branches in 25 countries, drawing 3,000 members into the fold.  
Along with the New York-based China Democracy Party’s Joint Headquarters, these 
organizations once formed the backbone of the overseas opposition, but today they are only a 
shadow of their old selves, said Chen. He estimated that the alliance had only 200 members by 
2013 and the federation about 100 by the same year. The Chinese Democracy Party has now 
splintered into eight major factions, each with its own agenda. 
 
When the alliance held its 17th Congress this October in Flushing, Queens, a smattering of 
attendees barely filled two rows of chairs. On what appears to be its official website, the alliance 
misspelled “democracy” in its name. 
 
John Kusumi, who founded the China Support Network(CSN) in 1989 to promote democratic 
initiatives in mainland China in the wake of Tiananmen, said fragmentation was inevitable. 
 
“I see a political divide that makes sense there,” said Kusumi, now a software developer who ran 
for U.S. president as a teenager in 1984 on a lark. “There’s a difference between genuine 
revolutionaries who want to sweep away the Communist Party on the one hand, and on the other 
hand those who are willing to accept incrementalism and gradualism.” 
 
Although ideological variations are often cited as a cause of disunity among activists, the 
hemorrhaging of support from both Chinese immigrants and non-Chinese goes far beyond 
healthy political debate, according to more than a dozen activists, scholars and former China 
correspondents interviewed. They contend that shifting global economics and internecine strife 
hastened the decline.    
 
Zhou Fengsuo, who ranked fifth among the 21 most-wanted Tiananmen student leaders, 
attributed the loss of institutional support to two mistakes the United States made after the 
crackdown. 
 
First, President George H.W. Bush secretly dispatched his national security adviser, Brent 
Scowcroft, to Beijing in July 1989. According to a New York Times account, Scowcroft toasted 
Chinese leaders by candlelight, saying, “My colleagues and I have come here today as friends, to 
resume our important dialogue on international questions of vital interest to both our nations.” 
For Zhou, such a rapprochement was an affront to the sacrifice Chinese civilians had just made. 
Then, in 1995, President Bill Clinton renewed trade privileges, known as the most-favored-
nation status, for China. A White House statement said that the sole requirement for the renewal 
was a presidential determination that it would “substantially promote freedom of emigration in 
China.” 
 
The opening floodgate of trade between the two countries benefited the elite on both sides at the 
expense of others. 
  
“Ever since 1989, the United States has colluded with China through crony capitalism,” added 
Zhou, who was jailed for a year after Tiananmen and arrived in the United States in 1995. “They 
allied with Wall Street and transformed China into a massive sweatshop. Such a relationship was 
already decided by politics based on mutual business interests.”  
 
Zhou cited the huge trade imbalance between the countries as the best indicator that the United 
States had become too dependent on China’s cheap goods. Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack 
Obama, both Democrats, were equally complicit in perpetuating this asymmetrical tie by letting 
Chinese-made products flood the U.S. consumer market, he said. 
 
At the same time, Chinese immigrants in the United States, who had overwhelmingly supported 
the democracy movement, gradually distanced themselves, largely because of demographic 
changes. 
 
From the 1970s to the early 1990s, most mainland Chinese who moved to the United States came 
from Fujian and Guangdong provinces. They arrived with minimal skills and could find jobs 
only in blue-collar workplaces, such as restaurants, laundromats and tailor shops. In the last two 
decades, however, Chinese professionals of better financial means started settling here, pursuing 
better job opportunities and a higher living standard abroad. 
 
The newer professional class is much less committed to the exiles’ endeavors, Zhou said. 
 
“These people feel that backing us won’t win them any benefits,” he explained. “And if they go 
back home, they can still enjoy a warm reception from the Communist Party.”  
 
A Rough Trail of Endemic Feuds 
 
It would be missing the bigger picture to say that the exiles’ changing relationship with the U.S. 
political establishment and their chillier reception among the Chinese diaspora, were entirely to 
blame for their decline. The biggest reason, experts and activists say, is infighting among the 
activists themselves. 
 
Rarely discussed in English-language media, this infighting has in fact been so unglamorous that 
few community insiders would openly comment on it at length. But people who are familiar with 
the exile community and those who have left activism offered candid assessments of this side of 
the story. 
 
“The exile community is a netherworld with unfathomable water, said Yi Sulaiman Gu, a Ph.D. 
candidate in chemistry at University of Georgia. “It looks clear on the surface, but if you stir it, it 
smells rotten.” 
 
Gu said he is familiar with the activist group because of his online activism for social causes in 
China and frequent media appearances. To illustrate his point, Gu brought up an activist whom 
many consider controversial. 
 
Tang Baiqiao, a Tiananmen-era dissident from Hunan province, was jailed for three years for 
counterrevolutionary crimes. After his release, he moved to the United States in 1992. Tang 
became widely publicized in the foreign media as he founded one nonprofit after another over 
the years, including the Tiananmen Generation in 1999, the Equal Education Foundation in 2005 
and the Democracy Academy of China in 2012.  
Many activists believe Tang’s morals are dubious, Gu said, claiming that he has pocketed 
donations for public causes.  
 
Tang’s latest act, his critics said, was the Conference of the Democratic Revolution in China, 
which he hosted in New York this fall. Tang promoted the event weeks in advance but said it 
would be off limit to the media. 
 
Tang said in August that he would not ask for public donations for the conference, but he later 
reversed himself and said he would hire certified accountants. The turnaround aroused 
skepticism among many activists, who said Tang had personally profited from donations he 
raised for numerous causes.  
 
In one instance, Tang requested public donations on Indiegogo to commission a bronze statue of 
Li Wangyang, a Chinese labor rights activist who died under suspicious circumstances in 2012.  
 
The sculptor, Chen Weiming, released a statement in September saying that he had not received 
any payment for the sculpture. 
 
Tang did not respond to requests for comment left on his Facebook and Twitter accounts, and 
efforts to reach him by phone were unsuccessful. 
 
Rose Tang, a Tiananmen survivor who was among the last students to evacuate the square in the 
early hours of June 4, 1989, also refuses to consider herself part of the movement. She arrived in 
the United States in 2005 after working as a journalist for more than a decade.  
 
Now an artist with an autonomous streak, Rose Tang—who is not related to Tang Baiqiao—said 
the prevailing factor in the infighting among activists is the “cannibalistic culture” of the Chinese 
people. 
 
“Many in the democracy movement hold aloft the banner of democracy and exploit human 
tragedy as a business,” she said. “They are a very marginalized group, and most could not speak 
English. They aim to fulfill personal ambitions while competing for limited resources, and I 
never cared to eat from their bowl.”  
 
Despite all the talk about selfishness and egotism, some believe that difficult personal 
circumstances in exile are also a divisive force. Ming Xia, professor of political science at the 
College of Staten Island and a faculty member at the CUNY Graduate Center, is one of them. 
 
In an interview, Xia called himself a “bipolar animal.” On one hand, he became a China expert 
by researching comparative politics and grew familiar with many activists in exile. On the other 
hand, he actively supported the 1989 movement as a young teacher at Fudan University in 
Shanghai.  
 
After the crackdown, Xia decided to further his education abroad and earned a Ph.D. degree in 
political science from Temple University in 1997.  
 
At once a scholar and a participant, Xia believes several factors fueled a schism among activists.  
 
The most obvious, he said, is that the Communist Party is adept at infiltrating their ranks and 
bribed many of them in exchange for collaboration with the government. This claim is espoused 
by several other activists, who believe a vast espionage network works to undermine the 
movement. Although they could never be sure who were the operatives, they said countless fake 
social media accounts under the guise of prominent dissidents were the latest sign of continuing 
sabotage. These accounts, they said, are often used to smear fellow activists and create a 
perception of internal disarray. 
 
To make matters worse, financial resources available to the exile community and to the 
Communist Party are so lopsided that the activists lack muscle in confronting a state machine. To 
avail themselves of tenuous outside backing, many have to fight it out, frequently with ad 
hominem attacks and groundless slanders. 
 
A String of Promises Kept 
 
Although the exile movement seems to be waning, activists said they remained undeterred and 
vowed to carry on as long as what they see as an illegitimate party continues to rule their 
homeland. By keeping the flame of democracy alive, they can deliver warmth to those who 
challenge the mainland political system.  
 
Among those who have spent untold hours networking with Chinese dissidents back home is Lu 
Jinghua, 57, who closed her small clothing store in Beijing to raise money for student protesters 
in 1989. She was later wanted by the police for “counterrevolutionary crimes” as a working-class 
activist. Lu was subsequently rescued via Hong Kong and settled in New York in 1990. She said 
the exiles were the only hope that the international community would learn about China’s 
egregious and persistent human rights violations. 
 
“What we are doing here is what people back home simply cannot do,” said Lu, who said she has  
been communicating with mainland activists and ordinary citizens in recent years through 
encrypted messaging apps. “Those who are fighting for their rights in the mainland keep pushing 
the boundaries, but they hardly garner much outside attention. To change that, activists here have 
helped compile their cases and facilitated communications with foreign media.” 
 
In addition to publicity work, she said the exiles have testified before major congressional 
committees to educate U.S. policymakers on Beijing’s myriad human rights violations.  
 
In an emotional congressional hearing the day after Liu Xiaobo died, Yang Jianli, president of 
Initiatives for China, laid bare the lapses and responsibilities of the West. 
 
“The Western countries’ appeasement policy towards China’s human rights abuses has made 
them accomplices of Liu Xiaobo’s slow murder,” Yang said in his opening remarks to a House 
Foreign Affairs subcommittee. “If the world continues to acquiesce to China’s aggression against 
its own people, appeasing the Chinese Communist Party without any moral clarity, Liu Xiaobo’s 
tragedy will repeat, and more human rights activists will languish and disappear in Chinese 
prisons.” 
 
In a follow-up interview, Yang said lobbying the Congress was a daunting challenge. 
 
“Theoretically, Washington has consistently recognized the importance of human rights 
everywhere, including in China,” Yang said. “But the biggest problem is that China’s human 
rights condition is a remote topic to both American politicians and their constituencies, so trying 
to keep it on their radar has been extremely difficult.” 
 
Despite that apparent distance, the exiles have counted a few members of Congress among their 
steadfast allies. Their most recognized champion, activists say, is Nancy Pelosi, the House 
minority leader. 
 
With a long track record of promoting human rights in China, Pelosi visited Beijing in 1991 and 
unfurled a banner in Tiananmen Square to pay homage to those who had died for democracy two 
years earlier. She has also befriended many overseas Chinese dissidents over the years and 
received numerous awards and recognitions from the exile community.  
 
Pelosi did not respond to requests for comments on her role in Washington on China’s human 
rights and democracy issues. 
 
 
A Fraught Presidency and Political Brinkmanship  
 
While many exiles are diverting more resources home, they cannot ignore the more immediate 
reality in their adopted country. Now with President Donald Trump in power, activists and 
scholars interviewed for this article agree that they are living through a turbulent time. 
 
While some said they hoped that Trump would exert much pressure on China as he promised 
during his campaign, the president has extensive business ties with China that might make him 
unlikely to risk for democracy or human rights. 
 
Since 2005, Trump’s companies have filed at least 130 trademarks in China for businesses 
including restaurants, bars and hotels. A month before the 2016 election, the Chinese news 
media quoted Eric Danziger, the chief executive of Trump Hotels, telling attendees in Hong 
Kong that the company was planning to open new hotels in 20 to 30 Chinese cities.  
Since his inauguration, Trump has been sending mixed signals. Although he hired top political 
operatives critical of China’s trade surpluses—among them Stephen Bannon and Peter 
Navarro—and at one point vowed to impose a 45 percent tariff on China, the Trump family 
continued to register scores of lucrative trademarks with the Chinese government. 
 
Critics say these practices signal that Trump has vast personal stakes in the Chinese economy, 
raising many conflicts of interest that would jeopardize key U.S. diplomatic positions with 
China, including human rights.  
 
His indifference to such issues is a clear break from previous administrations, which advocated 
political democratization in China. In a March 2016 statement about the Tiananmen crackdown 
that outraged the overseas movement, Trump said during a Republican presidential debate that 
he saw the carnage as “a strong, powerful government that put it down with strength” and a 
legitimate response to a “riot.” 
 
Andrew Nathan, an expert on Chinese politics and professor of political science at Columbia 
University, said that it has historically been difficult to lobby the Washington establishment to 
endorse the efforts of Chinese political exiles, and it has become more so now. As a result, it is a 
huge task for these activists to figure out how to step up their game. 
 
“Human rights in China is generally a nonpartisan issue on the Hill, such as Liu Xiaobo and 
Tiananmen,” said Nathan, a board member of Human Rights in China since 1989. “However, 
when you get into what should be done about these human rights violations, you start to hear 
many opinions. 
 “Take this administration, for example. You have lots of Wall Street people who would like to 
preserve strong economic ties with China since there’s so much business to be done,” he 
continued. “You also have Bannon and Navarro who believe in a trade war between them. In the 
end, you’ve got to recognize that some U.S. political actors today take human rights issue in 
China as a bargaining chip, so activists should be very careful about whom they turn to.” 
 
A Belated Reckoning 
 
Many Chinese exiles, who became disillusioned by the tepid reception from foreign governments 
in recent years, are abandoning Western support altogether. They said countries that used to 
stand up to China for its human rights violations and authoritarianism, are ceding their principles 
for the economic bonanza that its 1.38 billion people represent.  
 
“Chinese regime has become very thick-skinned and violates international laws with impunity, 
and the U.S. government is backing off so much that it barely protested when Liu Xiaobo died,” 
Zhou Fengsuo of Humanitarian China said.  
 
Xu Wenli, who like Hu Ping was a Democracy Wall leader, also spoke frankly about the 
movement’s future.  
 
“Whether a political movement happens and is sustained is not dictated by other countries but is 
rooted in the needs of its own people,” he said. “The democracy movement in exile strives for 
nothing but the welfare of people in mainland China, so it will certainly not die off.” 
 
“Even in the past, we didn’t receive much from the West, and the pittances they did commit only 
had a limited impact. The lesson we have learned is that we should never rely on foreign states 
from now on.” 
 
Despite fierce headwinds, activists agreed that their struggles to survive cannot ever give to 
capitulation, as history would more likely remember what had changed because of them than 
who they were.  
 
“If no one who lives in the free world dares oppose the Communist Party, what kind of collective 
image does it paint for the Chinese people?” said Chen Jie, the professor who studies Chinese 
political opposition in Australia. “In that case, aren’t we becoming a laughingstock as a venal 
and bizarre people?” 
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To view the timeline of events that shaped the overseas Chinese democracy movement on a 
separate webpage, please click here. 
If you would like to contact the writer, please email him. 
 
